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An overview of payments fraud
Payments fraud can be broadly defined as any activity 
that uses information from any type of payments 
transaction for unlawful gain. Such fraud can be per-
petrated on any type of payments device, including 
credit and debit cards, cash, checks, online or mobile 
payments, and automated clearinghouse (ACH) trans-
actions. Payments fraud can be committed knowingly 
by a consumer (first-party fraud), or consumers can 
be victimized by fraudsters operating within financial 
institutions or as part of criminal enterprises (third-party 
fraud). Payments fraud has received extensive atten-
tion in the popular press and in public policy venues 
recently, and the payments industry is fighting the 
perception that fraud is now occurring at unmanage-
able levels. While there has been increasing emphasis 
on all types of payments fraud, fraud perpetrated by 
criminals has received special attention of late.1
Fraud is a very real threat to the payments system’s 
efficiency. According to one recent report, 71 percent 
of surveyed organizations experienced payments fraud 
in 2007, and over one-third of those firms reported  
financial losses stemming from the fraudulent activity.2 
As another example of the size of the payments fraud 
problem, in a 2007 data breach involving TJX Companies 
Inc. (the holding company of retailers T. J. Maxx, 
Marshalls, Winners, HomeGoods, TK Maxx, A. J. 
Wright, and HomeSense), 45,700,000 credit card and 
debit card account numbers were stolen, along with 
455,000 merchandise return records containing cus-
tomer names and driver’s license numbers. Latest  
reports allege that an additional 48 million people 
have been affected for a total of over 30 percent of 
the entire U.S. population. The situation has cost TJX 
Companies Inc. more than $130 million in settlement 
claims. The breach was a worldwide effort perpetrated 
by criminals from the United States, Eastern Europe, 
and China. The U.S. Department of Justice has arrested 
11 people in this case, which is the largest hacking and 
identity theft case ever prosecuted by the department.3 
As more payments become electronic, the size and 
scope of payments fraud has grown, in part because the 
relevant parties in a payments transaction do not know 
one another. Information about those parties is vital to 
prevent fraud and enable legitimate transactions. How-
ever, as innovations in payments technology have made 
authentication of information more reliable, other tech-
nological innovations have made that information more 
widely available and subject to abuse. Fraud such as 
counterfeiting or check forgery has always had a global 
reach. However, payments fraud used to be much more 
reliant on physical connections between parties, such 
as the theft of an individual checkbook or credit card. 
Today, modern databases, online information 
sharing, and increased access points have opened up 
opportunities for sophisticated criminal gangs to perpe-
trate fraud from remote corners of the globe. Further, 
the growing presence of nonbanks and third-party service 
providers means that regulated financial institutions 
must consider the security of those providers. At the 
same time, new laws and standards are being developed 
for payment activities and instruments. While the con-
tinual refining of systems and rules arguably makes pay-
ments easier and more efficient, the fast pace of change 
can compound fraud potential as fraudsters hunt to 
exploit the weakest link in the emerging systems. 
In this complex environment, market participants 
and governments must determine whether new payment  1Q/009, Economic Perspectives
types carry excessive fraud risk; who is liable when 
payments fraud occurs; how losses are allocated; what 
consumer protections should be in place; how notifi-
cation of fraud should be handled; and how standards 
should be defined to minimize the incidence of fraud. 
It is a tall order, but payments providers must also identify 
consumers whom they have never met and authorize 
electronic transactions from which they might be far re-
moved. And, increasingly, they must do this in real time. 
To explore the problem of payments fraud, the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago organized its eighth 
annual Payments Conference around the topic. The 
conference, Payments Fraud: Perception Versus Reality, 
took place on June 5–6, 2008.4 In this article, we sum-
marize the conference and focus on the following 
themes: why the industry is worried about payments 
fraud; managing fraud risks; the impact of technology 
and innovation on fraud; responsibilities and incentives 
for fraud prevention; and public sector involvement in 
mitigating payments fraud. We note that market par-
ticipants agree that payments fraud cannot be eliminated 
without risking the viability of certain payment channels, 
but also find that close industry collaboration, properly 
aligned incentives, technological innovations, and  
active risk management can lessen fraud’s ill effects. 
Why worry about payments fraud?
Fraud degrades operational performance and in-
creases cost—not only for the parties to the transactions 
whose payments are disrupted, but also for the payments 
system as a whole. Indeed, payments networks are 
vulnerable to fraud at any point in a payments chain, 
and fraudsters often attempt to exploit the weakest link 
in that chain. One of the foremost concerns is the poten-
tial for a single data breach or compromise to disrupt 
an entire payments system. According to conference 
panelist Jeff Schmidt, an independent consultant, it is 
possible for a single data breach to affect multiple layers 
in the payments system and disrupt the efficient oper-
ation of the entire system if confidence in the system 
is lost. 
Further, Mark Greene, Fair Isaac Corporation, raised 
the possibility of a mass compromise of significant 
components of the U.S. payments industry. Greene 
said that the industry is not prepared for a mass attack 
wherein fraudsters target multiple companies simulta-
neously through hacking and sophisticated phishing 
techniques.5 These threats have the potential not only 
to harm a financial institution but also to degrade the 
payments system globally. Bruce Summers, a payments 
system and technology management consultant, ques-
tioned whether the marketplace alone could contain 
fraud and protect the payments system as a whole if 
such a mass compromise were to occur. Indeed, Allison 
Edwards, Fiserv EFT, commented that the payments 
industry was completely caught off guard by the afore-
mentioned 2007 TJX Companies data breach because 
of its size and scope. 
It is important to note that there is a distinction in 
the payments industry between actual fraud that has 
been perpetrated and potential fraud from compromised 
information that might not necessarily result in criminal 
activity. Ellen Richey, Visa Inc., claimed that the number 
of compromise incidents in the United States is rising, 
while other analysts contend that only the reporting 
of these incidents is increasing. Regardless of the magni-
tude of growth, industry leaders are concerned about 
both stopping compromises from occurring and ensur-
ing that significant fraud does not take place when com-
promises do occur. Conference panelists maintained that 
when such fraud happens, consumer confidence can 
only be restored by a fast and thorough industry response. 
Managing fraud risks 
As it stands, many in the industry find it difficult 
to gauge the full impact of fraud on the payments  
system. Richey applauded the payments industry for 
doing a good job in stemming the tide of increasing 
fraud attacks, stating that global fraud rates in the card 
industry have remained largely constant since 2002. 
Others at the conference argued that, while the total 
amount of fraud has gone down, the impact of the fraud 
that does occur has become more costly to society. 
Summers commented that many in the payments in-
dustry argue that today’s level of fraud protection is 
sufficient, and noted that few market participants seem 
dissatisfied with the overall state of payments fraud. 
Some players view fraud as just another cost of doing 
business, though according to several conference partici-
pants, that view is being overshadowed by an urgent 
need to keep fraud under control.6
According to David Poe, of Edgar, Dunn, and 
Company, many payments participants often make sub-
optimal risk-management business decisions because 
the true cost of fraud is misunderstood. Most analysts 
only take account of fraud losses to issuers (banks 
that issue payment cards to consumers or businesses) 
when tallying fraud costs. Poe noted that the monthly 
benchmarks for issuers’ fraud losses are approximate-
ly 0.07–0.08 percent of transaction volumes. Fraud 
losses to acquirers (banks that process card payments 
for merchants) from chargebacks are also of about the 
same magnitude. Poe echoed Greene by noting that 
statistics on issuers’ credit card losses from first-party 
fraud showed that fraud could account for as much as 
10 percent of their credit losses if correctly categorized. 9 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Moreover, opportunity cost—where consumers pass 
up one payment option or company in favor of another 
because of perceived security concerns—is arguably 
the biggest cost of fraud and the most difficult to quan-
tify. It is the largest potential risk in that customers 
might not use a payment product at all, or might not 
use the product in the appropriate way, because they 
do not trust that the payment instrument is secure.
When determining the true cost of payments 
fraud, analysts sometimes also fail to count the cost 
borne by issuers, acquirers, and merchants to manage 
fraud risks. Bob Ledig, of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver, 
and Jacobson LLP, stated that the costs of fraud cannot 
be limited to direct costs borne by any one party in 
the payments system. Rather, resource, compliance, 
enforcement, reputation, and litigation costs must also 
be taken into consideration. He noted that data security 
should be an inherent part of the payments vehicle, 
rather than a separate line of business. These comments 
about the true price of payments fraud raise the possi-
bility that there may be some type of market failure in 
the payments system, wherein the nature of fraud is 
so complex that firms are unable to price it correctly. 
To keep costs down and to better manage the risk 
associated with payment channels and instruments,  
financial institutions are looking to incorporate an  
enterprise-wide approach to fraud management. Chal-
lenges arise because lines of business have historically 
been developed as independent silos. Judith Rinearson, 
of Bryan Cave LLP, stressed that payments laws and 
regulations have largely emerged around individual prod-
uct lines, making it difficult to implement enterprise-
wide solutions. Many audience members commented 
that small merchants also struggle to implement en-
terprise-wide solutions, as they lack the resources to 
obtain high-end fraud prevention tools. The transition 
to an enterprise-wide approach to fraud mitigation is 
driven by governance and culture. Conference partici-
pants felt that the comparative handful of organizations 
that have appointed “payment czars” have been more 
effective in looking at payments fraud across the in-
stitution as a whole. Yet, if an institution has a deeply 
siloed governance and organizational structure, it is 
difficult to develop consistent, cost-efficient business 
processes across different product lines. 
Greene urged the industry to take note of the “bal-
loon effect” in payments fraud. Namely, once fraud 
begins to decrease in one payment method, criminals 
often shift focus to another part of the payments sys-
tem, where fraud rates begin to rise. Audience members 
commented that fraud might also shift among regions 
or nations. Some speculated that the increasing use of 
chip and PIN (personal identification number) technology 
in Europe and Canada might lead criminals in those 
countries to focus on countries that rely more heavily 
on older magnetic stripe technology, such as the United 
States. These different types of fraud shifts could lead 
to misperceptions about what is truly occurring in the 
system as a whole, and they are especially important 
to consider when new payments technologies enter 
the market. 
Payments technology and innovation
On the one hand, technological innovations have 
enabled market participants to authenticate payments 
information more accurately in real time, greatly en-
hancing the security of electronic payments transactions. 
On the other hand, the speed of payments innovation 
can accelerate fraud risks. Traditionally, the payments 
industry has been slow to manage technology, while 
fraudsters have quickly adapted to the new channels 
available. Poe reinforced the idea that technology has 
made fraud easier to commit on a wide scale, citing 
the increases in phishing, pharming, skimming, and 
other fraud tactics that often rely on remote or card-
not-present transactions.7
According to Kevin Fu, University of Massachusetts 
Amherst, phishing is one of the biggest security prob-
lems on the Internet. It is certainly the easiest way a 
spammer (one who uses electronic messaging systems 
to indiscriminately send unsolicited bulk messages) 
can infiltrate thousands or millions of compromised 
machines around the world. If just a tiny fraction of 
the people spammed respond, the spammer can obtain 
quite a bit of sensitive information that can be used to 
perpetrate fraud. Richey went further by saying that 
the top vulnerabilities in the payments system are the 
storing of prohibited data; out-of-date security systems; 
perimeter security; weak wireless security systems; 
and structured query language (SQL) injection attacks.8 
These vulnerabilities can only be addressed if every 
participant in the payments system is accountable and 
vigilant about protecting data, upgrading systems, and 
monitoring its own staff and its partner firms. How-
ever, upgrading software and infrastructure can be 
quite costly. In some cases, technology enhancements 
happen so quickly that companies, especially small 
merchants and processors, have little time to react. 
Consumer perceptions of fraud risks can also di-
rectly impact the success of a new payment method. 
Greene noted that consumers’ perception that mobile 
and contactless payments are more prone to fraud  
has apparently stunted the growth of those payment 
channels in the United States. Mobile payments are 
payments that are initiated by a mobile device, such 
as a mobile phone.9 A contactless payment device, such 10 1Q/009, Economic Perspectives
as a card or fob, uses radio frequency identification 
(RFID) or near field communication (NFC) technolo-
gy to make secure payments. The embedded chip and 
antenna enable consumers to wave their payment de-
vice over a reader at the point of sale. Both RFID and 
NFC payment methods are relatively new in the U.S. 
market, and it should be noted that it often takes time 
for consumers to adopt any new instrument or market. 
Bruce Cundiff, Javelin Strategy and Research, echoed 
the sentiment that risk adversely affects consumer adop-
tion of these new payment instruments. Because repair-
ing the damage done by payments fraud is becoming 
more complex for consumers, many are reluctant to 
switch to a new payment method. For example, in a 
recent Javelin survey, 65 percent of those who said they 
did not want to use contactless cards named security 
fears as the number one reason, and 33 percent of 
those surveyed viewed mobile banking as too risky.10
Cundiff pointed out a marked change in the way 
that consumers perceive the security efforts of their 
financial institutions. Consumers now want to be more 
engaged in security measures and view companies 
that allow them to be engaged through account alerts 
or verification calls as being more reliable. Rinearson 
agreed, arguing that many consumers are confused 
about fraud prevention features of different payment 
cards, such as prepaid cards11 versus debit or credit 
cards. For example, consumers might find out about 
fraudulent transactions from billing statements for 
their debit cards or credit cards, but would not have 
such information for a number of prepaid cards. 
Payments fraud can affect the availability of new 
products as well. Payments providers might be hesitant 
to innovate in an area where unknown fraud risks ex-
ist. Paul Tomasofsky, Two Sparrows Consulting LLC, 
said that the newly emerging decoupled debit field 
faces challenges as issuers work out several potential 
risks. A decoupled debit card is a debit card issued by 
a nonbank or bank that is linked to a demand deposit 
account that the issuer does not own. The payments 
are processed on the automated clearinghouse network, 
are typically co-branded with a particular merchant, 
and may include other options such as a credit feature 
or reward program.12 Tomasofsky pointed out that is-
suers need to thoroughly authenticate both the user of 
the card and the user’s checking account to verify that 
they are in fact linked. Issuers, moreover, run the risk of 
the account holder having nonsufficient funds because 
they aren’t able to check deposit account balances  
directly. It is also unclear who will be responsible for 
handling dispute resolution for decoupled debit cards. 
While relatively low merchant fees may make these 
cards attractive to the merchant community, their slow 
start suggests that some of these perceived risks 
might be impeding their adoption. 
Online payments also face numerous threats from 
payments fraud. Steve Malphrus, Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, noted that fraud is more 
prevalent in online transactions than in person-to- 
person transactions. According to Bob West, Echelon 
One, there is $2.3 billion–$3.2 billion in online credit 
card fraud per year, much of which is orchestrated by 
very sophisticated crime syndicates.13
Moreover, even traditional payment forms that 
are undergoing modernization face new potential fraud 
risks. For example, David Walker, Electronic Check 
Clearing House Organization (ECCHO), explained that 
in check imaging, technology moved much faster than 
the laws related to handling check fraud issues. While 
imaging reduces fraud potential over paper checks, in-
dustry players are unsure how to interpret their new roles 
related to risk management. Walker explained how new 
forms of check fraud have arisen following the intro-
duction of check imaging. These forms of fraud include 
a greater volume of duplicate checks and images that 
do not conform to standards set in the Check Clearing 
for the 21st Century Act.14 Walker said that many in-
stitutions struggle to decide whether imaged checks 
are authorized and who should receive returned checks. 
The increased fraud risk from some technological 
innovations has even begun to change the way that in-
stitutions view new customer relationships for deposit 
accounts. Malphrus commented on how the increase in 
remote account opening has created a new set of fraud 
risks, which can hopefully be managed by increasingly 
sophisticated authentication technologies. West expanded 
on this theme by discussing the overall disconnection 
between the physical and online worlds in payments, 
stating that this basic problem is with us to stay.
Fraud perpetrators regularly exploit new technol-
ogies to their benefit, but payments providers are 
working to find ways to exploit technology for fraud 
resolution as well. These firms are incorporating tech-
nology into the broader design of their fraud detection 
mechanisms. Edwards noted that “neural” networks15 
are helping companies to manage their risk profiles 
more conservatively by adding the elements of time 
control and customer targeting. Fu discussed the ways 
that RFID technology in contactless cards and mobile 
payment devices can allow for sophisticated tracking 
in order to reduce fraudulent transactions. The RFID tags, 
which mimic minicomputers and store enormous 
amounts of data, can mitigate the security risk of 
handing over your card to someone who may want to 
compromise the information contained on it. 11 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Greene mentioned the rise of profiling mechanisms 
that compile fraud patterns for specific merchants as 
well as in geographically dispersed payment devices 
and terminals. These mechanisms can be used in adap-
tive models that keep up with changes in fraud patterns; 
they allow users to dynamically change model weights 
to suit their needs. He argued that fraud prevention 
should not be viewed as providing a competitive ad-
vantage for any firm. Otherwise, fraud becomes too 
great of a collective problem. Fu also supported the 
use of open source RFID technology rather than the 
proprietary systems that companies are now pursuing. 
This idea furthers the notion that collaboration is re-
quired to combat fraud in the payments system. 
Responsibilities and incentives  
for fraud prevention
Conference participants noted that, as consumers, 
merchants, and payments providers struggle with the 
issue of payments fraud, the goal is not to eliminate 
fraud but rather to generate better risk-management 
practices that strike a balance between allowing for 
risks in the payments system and dictating payments 
choices. Speakers at the conference were unanimous 
in the view that collaboration within and among com-
panies is a necessary aspect of successful payments 
fraud mitigation. Security is expensive to achieve and 
maintain. Therefore, it can result in indirect but none-
theless real costs to consumers if those costs are trans-
ferred. Cooperation is thus not only desirable but  
also necessary. 
According to the conference speakers, in order  
to be effective, payments fraud mitigation efforts must 
recognize the need to include all members of the sys-
tem. To do this, incentives must be properly aligned. 
Market participants must have sufficient reasons to 
care about fraud mitigation. For instance, Mallory 
Duncan, National Retail Federation, argued that we 
currently have pricing and protection scenarios that 
encourage customers to use signature-based payment 
cards rather than PIN-based cards, leading to perverse 
incentives to use a payment vehicle that is perceived 
to be less secure. Moreover, banks and merchants of-
ten base their preference for different payments mech-
anisms on narrow cost reasons, thereby overlooking 
the hidden costs embedded on the security side. 
Duncan also noted that if merchants do not feel 
that they are directly benefiting from increased data 
security, they will not be willing to pay for new security 
infrastructure. He said that it is very difficult for mer-
chants to keep up with constantly changing payments 
rules, as merchants are being asked to handle payments 
technologies that are outside of their core competencies. 
Schmidt countered that today all industries face security 
issues and that compliance is not specific to payments. 
Several conference participants suggested that 
one solution to the problem of data storage standards 
is to be parsimonious with payments data and store only 
as little as the law requires. Mark Michelon, Orbitz 
Worldwide, explained that fraud detection needs to be 
automated in order for merchants to do it in a cost- 
effective manner. Richey elaborated by stating that 
effective authentication can make stolen data useless. 
Schmidt agreed, noting that there is so much payments 
data available that fraud solutions should not focus on 
limiting data but rather on making the data less mean-
ingful. Public disclosure of sensitive data devalues the 
data for fraudsters and essentially halts the fraud. In 
other words, if data such as Social Security numbers 
are not deemed to be highly confidential, the impact 
of having such data stolen will not be as great. Alter-
native types of data include addresses or zip codes;  
according to Richey, these are quite effective authen-
tication tools in many instances.
Schmidt suggested that incentives for fraud pre-
vention should be aligned with responsibility and that 
potential victims should be given good reasons to 
care about protecting their own payments data. Several 
presenters commented on consumers’ relative lack of 
incentives in preventing payments fraud, especially  
in the credit card market where zero liability policies 
protect consumers from virtually all losses. Duncan 
Douglass, of Alston and Bird LLP, argued that there 
needs to be a realistic price tag placed on risk. Cur-
rently, he said, attorneys work with payments system 
participants to help them decide if paying to eliminate 
risk is worth the cost. Payment channels rely on cus-
tomer confidence for survival, but there is a moral 
hazard problem when customers have little incentive 
to be careful with data. Michelon stated that one solu-
tion to this problem is consumer education about pay-
ments fraud and data protection. While these efforts 
can be useful, in order for them to have meaningful 
effects, all actors in the payments system must have 
similar incentives to avoid payments fraud.
Indeed, if fraudsters are to stay in business, it 
would seem to be in their best interest to avoid creat-
ing a situation where a mass compromise would dis-
rupt the payments system as a whole or destroy a 
specific payment channel that had previously proven 
lucrative for them. Marsha McClellan, United States 
Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Illinois, 
remarked that there should be real consequences for 
committing payments fraud that are significant enough 
to make criminals think twice. She stated that it is 
difficult to prosecute a payments fraud case because 1 1Q/009, Economic Perspectives
of the electronic nature of the crime, which usually 
means there is not much physical evidence. Moreover, 
many consumers have a hard time pinpointing com-
promised information. McClellan suggested that mon-
etary incentives were the most likely way to deter fraud. 
United States Attorneys have the authority to seize 
the proceeds of criminal activity even before prosecu-
tions occur. If funds are seized, criminals lose the 
ability to continue their operations. However, Sujit 
Chakravorti, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, agreed 
with Schmidt’s point that this type of monetary incen-
tive does not work for irrational actors, such as pedo-
philes, terrorists, and other perpetrators of payments 
fraud who are not motivated primarily by financial 
goals. Clearly, these types of actors present a problem 
to society that goes far beyond payments. Some argue 
that the existence of such issues with broad implica-
tions for our society leads to the need for public sec-
tor intervention in the problem of payments fraud.
The role of the public sector
Payments markets contain strong public-good 
components. Gene Amromin, Federal Reserve Bank 
of Chicago,16 argued that payments services are nei-
ther purely public goods nor purely private goods; 
thus, they are best provided by the private sector but 
with government oversight. Because of the inherent 
conflicts of interest, as noted in the previous discussion 
concerning misaligned incentives, the public sector 
can help counter information asymmetries by design-
ing proper mechanisms to deter fraud, helping to align 
incentives to prevent fraud, and providing information 
to all levels of the payments system about the issue of 
payments fraud. While government involvement might 
therefore be seen as a crucial component in combating 
payments fraud, no clear consensus emerged at the con-
ference on the best specific strategies for doing this.17
Charles Docherty, MBNA Canada Bank, offered 
a perspective on how other nations deal with the role 
of government in payments fraud. In Canada, where 
there are fewer financial institutions and the central 
bank is not an active participant in the payments mar-
ket, payments issues are largely governed by the pri-
vate Canadian Payments Association, which consists 
of credit unions and banks. Docherty argued that in 
Canada, consumers and payments providers are con-
sidered the first line of defense for fighting payments 
fraud, followed by the government. 
In contrast to the payments environment in Canada, 
in the United States regulatory and legal incentives have 
always been a central aspect of payments. Christian 
Johnson, University of Utah S. J. Quinney College  
of Law,18 noted that there are four types of laws that 
directly affect how payments fraud issues are handled 
(most of them involving the public sector): contracts 
between payments parties; state laws and regulations; 
federal laws and regulations; and international laws 
and treaties. All participants in the payments system 
must recognize these legal constraints.
Greene highlighted the importance of the govern-
ment in the extremely crowded and competitive U.S. 
payments market. He said that the payments industry 
is concerned that sharing data and strategies related to 
payments fraud prevention might be viewed as collu-
sive, possibly leading to a need for objective govern-
ment intervention. Richey noted that by setting uniform 
rules, the public sector would be in a unique position 
to get at the root of payments fraud. However, Richey 
cautioned that too much intervention would stifle in-
novation. Some audience members argued that a uni-
form set of standards for all payment channels, governed 
by one body, would greatly deter payments fraud.
Ledig commented that the recent proposal by 
U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr., to give 
the Federal Reserve more power over all payment 
forms would be a step toward centralizing payments 
policy.19 Charles Evans, president and chief executive 
officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, reiterated 
that one of the key responsibilities of the Federal  
Reserve is to maintain the integrity of the U.S. pay-
ments system. Malphrus suggested that even in the 
current framework, which does not give the Federal 
Reserve governance over the entire payments system, 
the Fed should take up both advisory and participato-
ry roles for that system. Such a role would still let the 
private market thrive. Some in the audience suggest-
ed that the Federal Reserve is in a unique position to 
advise on payments fraud issues, since it is both a di-
rect participant and an overseer of the payments mar-
ketplace. Others, however, argued that these roles could 
prove conflicting for the Fed. Overall, conference partici-
pants seemed to favor a balanced approach of govern-
ment and central bank intervention with support that 
would still allow the private market to police itself. 
Conclusion
Participants in the conference felt that some level 
of fraud will always remain: Fraud could be eliminated 
entirely from the market only by shutting down active 
payment channels. However, a consensus was reached 
that the effects of data breaches and information  
compromises can be minimized through a holistic ap-
proach to data security. Such an approach would recog-
nize the importance of cooperation within and across 
companies and among various actors in the private 
market. This cooperation would also be advanced by 1 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
government actions that are able to bring more uni-
formity to fraud mitigation without stifling innovation. 
Fraud is an ongoing issue in the payments market, 
and the fast pace of technological change is likely to 
bring new opportunities for fraud to occur at the same 
time that it will spur more efficient fraud mitigation so-
lutions. Policy leaders around the globe are struggling 
to define new rules and expectations of market partici-
pants, and industry leaders have different perspectives 
on the state of payments fraud and its future. The articles 
included in this volume represent various views on 
payments fraud from academic and industry speakers at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s 2008 Payments 
Conference.
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2008 Payments Conference
Payments Fraud: Perception Versus Reality
Thursday, June 5, 2008
InTRoDuCTIon AnD WelCome 
Gordon Werkema, First Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, 
  Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
KeYnoTe SPeeCH 
Divided We Fall: Fighting Payments Fraud Together
Mark Greene, Chief Executive Officer, Fair Isaac Corporation 
IDenTIFYInG SeCuRITY ISSueS In THe ReTAIl PAYmenTS SYSTem 
Moderator: Robert Ledig, Partner, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP 
Panelists
David Poe, Managing Director, Edgar, Dunn & Company 
Ellen Richey, Chief Enterprise Risk Officer, Visa Inc. 
 
Talking Points 
What are the main security threats to retail payments? 
What are the potential costs of payments fraud and of solutions to guard against it? 
What role, if any, should public authorities play to protect payments system participants  
  from these threats? 
FRAuD ConTAInmenT 
Moderator: Bruce Summers, Payment System and Technology Management Consultant 
Panelists 
Jeff Schmidt, Consultant 
Bob West, Chief Executive Officer, Echelon One 
Mallory Duncan, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, National Retail Federation 
 
Talking Points 
What are the most common forms of retail payments fraud? 
What are the most effective fraud reduction tools, and how have these tools evolved  
  to support “real-time” payments? 
How do payment providers and merchants balance fraud risk and consumer convenience? 
FRAuD loSS AnD DISPuTe ReSoluTIon 
Moderator: Christian Johnson, Professor, University of Utah S. J. Quinney College of Law 
Panelists 
Mark Michelon, Senior Director, E-commerce Risk and Revenue Protection, Orbitz Worldwide 
Duncan Douglass, Partner, Alston & Bird LLP 
Charles Docherty, Legal Counsel, MBNA Canada Bank 
 1 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Talking Points 
Who is responsible for mitigating fraud in the payments system, and what are the consequences of that      
  responsibility? 
How are losses allocated when fraud occurs? 
Do current fraud resolution measures distort incentives for payments system participants  
  to adequately secure payment information? 
Friday, June 6, 2008
WelCome AnD InTRoDuCTIon 
Daniel G. Sullivan, Senior Vice President and Director of Research, Federal Reserve Bank 
  of Chicago 
SeCuRITY RISKS AnD SoluTIonS In emeRGInG PAYmenT CHAnnelS 
Moderator: Bruce Cundiff, Director of Payments Research, Javelin Strategy and Research
 
Panelists 
David Walker, President and Chief Executive Officer, Electronic Check Clearing House 
  Organization (ECCHO) 
Paul Tomasofsky, President, Two Sparrows Consulting LLC 
Kevin Fu, Assistant Professor, University of Massachusetts Amherst 
 
Talking Points 
Do new payment channels, such as mobile, electronic images of checks, and decoupled debit, entail different   
  fraud risks? 
Are new tools necessary to minimize risks associated with emerging payment platforms? 
Do these new channels provide any security features that mitigate risk in the payments system? 
KeYnoTe SPeeCH 
Introduction: Charles L. Evans, President and Chief Executive Officer, 
  Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
Steve Malphrus, Staff Director for Management, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
 
PublIC AnD PRIVATe ReSPonSeS To PAYmenTS FRAuD 
Moderator: William Roberds, Research Economist and Policy Advisor, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 
Panelists 
Judith Rinearson, Partner, Bryan Cave LLP 
Allison Edwards, Director of Product Development, Fiserv EFT 
Marsha McClellan, Chief, Money Laundering and Asset Forfeiture, United States Attorney’s Office 
  for the Northern District of Illinois 
 
Talking Points 
How can the government define its role in fraud containment without stifling innovation? 
Should different payment instruments have similar laws and regulations governing them? 
Have standards been an effective tool in combating payments fraud?
CloSInG RemARKS
Sujit Chakravorti, Senior Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago